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WIPO AND THE ACTA THREAT
Sara Bannerman1
ABSTRACT
The new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has been seen as a
potentially existential threat to the existing World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO)—as a new plurilateral institution that could replace
the older multilateral organization. The ACTA threat to WIPO has a
number of predecessors. WIPO’s centrality to international intellectual
property norm-setting encountered its first major challenge in 1952 when
the Universal Copyright Convention was established under UNESCO. It
encountered a second major challenge with the establishment of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPs
Agreement). The ACTA challenge thus potentially represents a third
instance where a major competing norm-setting institution has challenged
WIPO. In this paper I review past instances where WIPO has been
challenged by an outside norm-setting institution and the responses taken to
those challenges. Second, I outline the main proposals for an ACTA
institution. Third, drawing on the past instances, I outline the various
possible forms that an ACTA-WIPO relationship could take, and various
strategies that WIPO could use to maintain its role in the international
intellectual property system. Finally, I outline a number of public policy
concerns that the institutional proposals for ACTA pose.
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I.

BACKGROUND

The longest-standing international institution dealing with intellectual
property today is the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
WIPO is the successor to the United International Bureaux for the
Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), which was established 117
years ago in 1893. BIRPI and its successor, WIPO, have functioned for
over a century as the core of the international intellectual property system,
administering the fundamental copyright, patent, trademark, and
neighbouring rights, and other intellectual property treaties.
WIPO’s leadership in and centrality to the world intellectual property
system has fallen into question over the past decade. It has failed to
accomplish any new international agreements since the WIPO Internet
Treaties were established in 1997. This failure has led to the perception in
some circles that WIPO is not presently leading in the area of intellectual
property, and that other institutions may have overtaken WIPO as the key
centres of action.
One of the challenges currently faced by WIPO comes from a new
proposed treaty, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). ACTA
has been under negotiation since 2007, with the goal of combating
counterfeiting and piracy.
Proposed to cover intellectual property
enforcement, including enforcement at borders and over the Internet, the
treaty is under negotiation as a plurilateral, rather than a universal, treaty.
ACTA negotiating parties include Australia, Canada, the European Union
and its 27 member states, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States.2 Some
commentators have speculated that a new ACTA institution, if founded,
could present a tremendous challenge to WIPO. ACTA has been seen as a
potentially existential threat to WIPO—as a new institution that could
replace the older organization.3
The ACTA threat to WIPO has a number of predecessors. WIPO’s
centrality to international intellectual property norm-setting encountered its
first major challenge in 1952 when the Universal Copyright Convention
was established under UNESCO. WIPO encountered a second major
challenge with the establishment of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). ACTA thus potentially represents
a third instance where a major competing norm-setting institution has
challenged WIPO’s centrality and leadership in the international intellectual
property system.
ACTA negotiations have taken place outside of WIPO. Practical and
instrumental reasons for this stem in part from the failure of WIPO to make
significant strides towards new norm-setting, and in part from a desire to
negotiate ACTA among specific actors, rather than on a broad or universal
basis. Some have objected to the circumvention of WIPO. The European
Parliament passed a resolution deploring “the calculated choice of the
parties not to negotiate through well-established international bodies, such
as WIPO and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have
established frameworks for public information and consultation.”4 In what
was presumably a bid to engage WIPO in ACTA debates, the European
Parliament requested that WIPO and the WTO prepare reports on their own
practices of transparency, their current enforcement activities, whether there
is need for new enforcement activities, the relationship of ACTA to current
IP norms, and the likely effects of ACTA on flexibilities under the TRIPs
Agreement.5 The Wellington Declaration, issued by participants at a New
2
Joint Statement: ACTA Final Round, September 23 - October 2, 2010
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/joint_statementfinale-declaration_commune.aspx?lang=eng.
3
See Michael Geist, Toward an ACTA Super-Structure: How ACTA May Replace
WIPO (March 26, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4910/99999/.
4
European Parliament Res. of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play of
the ACTA negotiations, EUR. PARL. DOC. B7-0154/2010 (2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7TA-2010-0058.
5
See Kaitlin Mara, WIPO, WTO Requested to Advise on Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (April 15, 2010), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/04/15/european-parliamentarians-call-on-wipo-wto-for-technicaladvice-on-acta/. See also Lamy tells EU Parliament No (For Now) on ACTA,
INTELLECTUAL PROPRTY WATCH (May 13, 2010), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/05/13/lamy-tells-eu-parliament-no-for-now-on-acta/ (reporting that
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Zealand forum on ACTA just prior to the New Zealand round of ACTA
negotiations, also called WIPO the preferable forum for IP negotiations:
We note that the World Intellectual Property
Organisation has public, inclusive and transparent processes
for negotiating multilateral agreements on (and a committee
dedicated to the enforcement of) copyright, trademark and
patent rights, and thus we affirm that WIPO is a preferable
forum for the negotiation of substantive provisions
affecting these matters.6
WIPO has retained a public distance from ACTA, refraining from
comment on the negotiations until recently. Francis Gurry, the DirectorGeneral of WIPO, originally stated that he had not read the agreement and
knew little about ACTA.7 However, he has since made several statements.
In October 2009 he was reported as having commented, “‘Naturally we
prefer open, transparent international processes to arrive at conclusions that
are of concern to the whole world,’ he said, citing WIPO’s role as an
international, United Nations agency. And, he added, ‘IP is of concern to
the whole world.’”8 More recently, in May 2010, Gurry responded to the
letter from the European Parliament:
[Y]our letter raises the question of possible co-operation
between WIPO and a future ACTA Secretariat. Generally,
international cooperation is one of the key pillars of WIPO's
work in the field of IP enforcement, and the WIPO
Secretariat maintains close cooperation with a large number
of international IGOs and NGOs throughout its
enforcement-related activities. [. . .]
I should like to reiterate, however, that WIPO has not
participated in any capacity in the ACTA negotiations, nor
have there been consultations between the WIPO
Secretariat and the ACTA negotiating parties at any stage.
We therefore do not have any information as to the
the WTO has declined to prepare such a report).
6
The Wellington Declaration, PublicACTA Blog (Apr. 11, 2010, 3:21 PM),
http://publicacta.org.nz/wellington-declaration/#more-330.
7
See Mara, supra note 5.
8
Kaitlin Mara, Perpetual Protection Of Traditional Knowledge “Not On Table” At
WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Oct. 22, 2009, 4:01 PM), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2009/10/22/perpetual-protection-of-traditional-knowledge%E2%80%9Cnot-on-table%E2%80%9D-at-wipo/.
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objectives of the parties, including the potential role of
international organizations in a future ACTA Secretariat.
To date, WIPO has not been approached or received any
request concerning such co-operation and again, the
Organization's response would be guided by the decisions
of its Member States.9

In June 2010, in more direct public comments, Gurry called ACTA a
“bad development” for WIPO—an example of the difficulty faced by WIPO
and other UN agencies in addressing issues and concluding agreements. “A
number of countries feel [there is] an important area of public policy they
are not able to address in a multilateral forum, and so have gone outside the
multilateral framework to satisfy their desire for creating some form of
‘international’ cooperation,” he said. The challenge, according to Gurry, is
how to make the multilateral system relevant.10
II.

WIPO: THE INSTITUTION

WIPO was founded in 1970, when the 1967 Convention Establishing
the World Intellectual Property Organization came into effect.11 The
organization took over from its predecessor, BIRPI, which had acted as a
combined secretariat for several international intellectual property treaties
since 1893. Several years later, in 1974, WIPO became a specialized
agency of the United Nations (UN). BIRPI was originally a Europeandominated organization that had always sought to expand, especially into
the United States. In the 1970s WIPO strove to become a truly universal
organization. This effort was helped along when, in 1994, the World Trade
Organization Agreement required adherence to key WIPO-administered
treaties. Membership expanded, and WIPO now encompasses 164 member
states.12
WIPO’s key functions include the administration of intellectual property

9

Letter from Francis Gurry, Director General of WIPO, to Members of European
Parliament (May 6, 2010), available at http://en.act-onacta.eu/Greens_EFA_MEPs_letter_to_WIPO_and_WTO/Answer_from_WIPO.
10
Catherine Saez, ACTA A Sign Of Weakness In Multilateral System, WIPO Head
Says, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-headsays/.
11
See Christopher May, The World Intellectual Property Organization, 11(3) New
Pol. Econ. 435 (2006).
12
See World Intellectual Property Organization Member States,
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
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systems, such as processing patent applications under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and international trademark applications under
the Madrid System; the provision of technical assistance to help member
states build their capacity to protect and regulate intellectual property; and
international intellectual property norm-setting, including the initiation of
new treaties and the revision of old ones.
BIRPI was established as a simple secretariat in Berne with several staff
members. Over the past 117 years, it has expanded into a large
international institution. WIPO is now based at a complex in Geneva. It
has offices in New York, Rio de Janeiro, Singapore, and Tokyo.13 Regional
bureaus within WIPO coordinate and facilitate technical assistance to
Africa, the Arab countries, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the
Caribbean.14 Since 1998 WIPO has operated the WIPO Academy, which
offers training and professional development programs on IP in English,
Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish, including
various Master of IP Law programs that are run in partnership with outside
universities. Hundreds of students circulate through WIPO Academy
programs each year.15 Other services provided by the organization include
public outreach activities, the publication of WIPO Magazine, and the
hosting of events and conferences around the world.
74% of WIPO’s funding comes from PCT fees, and another 16% of its
funding comes from other fees under the various treaties it administers. The
remaining 10% comes from member state contributions and other income.
WIPO’s total income figures at 314 million Swiss francs ($311 million in
today’s USD), with staff expenditures of 194 million Swiss francs ($192
million in today’s USD) and non-staff expenditures of 87 million Swiss
francs ($86 million USD today).16
III.

THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION

BIRPI encountered its first outside competing norm-setting institution in
1952 when the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) was established
under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). Unlike ACTA, the UCC established lower rather than higher
levels of copyright protection. The UCC was therefore attractive to
developing countries for whom international copyright obligations created a

13

See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 6 (2009).
14
See id. at 27.
15
See id. at 31.
16
See id. at 50-51.
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net outflow of revenue. It was also attractive to the United States who, for
sixty-six years, had refused to join the Berne Convention, finding a number
of its requirements unsuitable to the American situation. The UCC quickly
garnered a broad and powerful membership, including, most prominently,
the United States.
The UCC was a threat to BIRPI on a number of levels. Though not an
existential threat to the organization, the UCC challenged what were viewed
as the high copyright standards that BIRPI represented, as well as the
breadth of the membership of BIRPI’s copyright treaty. In the years
between 1967 and 1971, the fundamental question of whether BIRPI/WIPO
would continue to attempt to achieve universal membership, or whether it
would cede parts of the world to its competitor, was answered. Two options
were on the table: BIRPI/WIPO could come to an arrangement with the
UCC that would allow BIRPI/WIPO to continue to attempt to achieve
universal membership, or the organization could instead cater to a more
restricted membership, consisting of only those countries who wished to
maintain the higher levels of copyright mandated by the Berne Convention.
In the latter case, the Universal Copyright Convention would provide an
alternative set of copyright norms catering to developing countries and the
United States, perhaps to act as a stepping stone for those countries’
eventual accession to the Berne Convention.17
BIRPI, and later WIPO, chose to come to an arrangement with the UCC
that would allow the two organizations to work together and to neutralize
the UCC threat to WIPO’s membership and norms. To achieve this goal, a
number of steps were taken. The two organizations held joint meetings of
their oversight bodies in order to share information, representation, and
plans. In 1971 the threat of the UCC was further neutralized when the two
conventions were simultaneously revised in a way that made their
provisions aimed at developing countries similar enough to eliminate the
temptation for a developing country to join one convention but not the
other. Provisions were also added to the agreement that would effectively
eliminate the possibility of developed countries from denouncing the Berne
Convention in favour of the UCC.18 The UCC came to be conceptualized
as a bridge leading to ultimate adherence to the Berne Convention.19
In 1967, when the convention that would establish the World

17

Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. OF THE
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S. 91, 92 (1970).
18
See Universal Copyright Convention, art. 17, July 24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 178. See
also 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INT’L COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §§ 18.27–37 (2d ed. 2006).
19
See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Intellectual Property Organization as a successor to BIRPI was signed, the
WIPO was given a new and broad mandate. When the WIPO Convention
came into effect in 1970, a number of new functions would ensure that the
organization had a continuing mandate.
IV.

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The TRIPs Agreement was also perceived as a threat to WIPO. The
United States, by 1986, had grown frustrated with its inability to increase
levels of intellectual property under WIPO and with the absence of an
effective WIPO enforcement mechanism. WIPO was seen as identifying
too strongly with the interests of developing countries, who held a majority
in the organization. That year, the U.S. shifted its IP treaty-making efforts
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).20
A 1995 Agreement between the World Intellectual Property
Organization and the World Trade Organization established a framework
that would ensure cooperative relations between WIPO and the WTO. That
agreement ensures cooperative use of resources (laws & regulations,
databases), cooperative provision of technical assistance, and regular
contact and exchange of information between the two organizations. As
Professor Laurence Helfer notes:
[T]he WTO did not supplant WIPO as the principal
intergovernmental organization devoted to intellectual
property lawmaking. TRIPs itself implicitly acknowledges
the continuing importance of WIPO as a forum for
negotiating treaties, particularly those embodying “higher
levels of protection of intellectual property rights.” In
addition, a 1995 agreement between WIPO and the WTO
requires each organization to provide technical and legal
assistance to developing countries, delegates to WIPO
certain administrative functions in TRIPs, and enhances
information sharing about national intellectual property
laws.
Seen from this perspective, the shift from WIPO to
GATT to TRIPs was not intended to eclipse WIPO. . . .
Whereas the WTO emphasized implementation,
enforcement, and dispute settlement, WIPO focused on

Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 177 (1989).
20
See Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law 46, 105 (2003).
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generating new forms of intellectual property protection,
administering existing intellectual property agreements, and
providing technical assistance to developing countries.21

The WIPO Development Agenda, established in 2007, has further
entrenched the cooperative relationship between the two organizations.
Recommendation 14 of the Development Agenda calls on WIPO to provide
advice to developing countries on the implementation of TRIPs:
Within the framework of the agreement between WIPO
and the WTO, WIPO shall make available advice to
developing countries and LDCs, on the implementation and
operation of the rights and obligations and the
understanding and use of flexibilities contained in the
TRIPS Agreement.22
The Development Agenda also cites TRIPs as a guideline for
WIPO’s activities:
45. To approach intellectual property enforcement in
the context of broader societal interests and especially
development-oriented concerns, with a view that “the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations”, in accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS
Agreement.23
Although initially perceived as a threat, TRIPs and WIPO became
complimentary institutions.24 At the same time, the advent of TRIPs may

21

Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 25 (2004).
22
World Intellectual Property Organization, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under
the WIPO Development Agenda 2 (2007), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipdevelopment/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf.
23
Id. at 5.
24
See Frederick Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving
Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 63, 63-81 (2000).
Abbott holds up the cooperation between WIPO and the WTO as a positive example of
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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have shifted perceptions of WIPO, such that the organization came to be
viewed to a greater extent as serving administrative and technical assistance
functions.
V.

ACTA: INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

Discussions about institutional arrangements for ACTA date back to
March of 2008, when Canada volunteered to write a non-paper outlining the
various options for an ACTA institution, for consideration by negotiating
partners.25 Since the leak of the Canadian non-paper, various draft texts of
ACTA have become available, as has a near-final official text resulting
from the Tokyo round of negotiations in October 2010. ACTA includes a
section on institutional arrangements.26
In general, the parties to the agreement appear to envision a very simple
and limited institutional structure. Japan, for example, suggested that “[i]n
order to avoid excessive burden of finance on human resources of the
Parties, the institutional structure of the ACTA should be as simple as
possible. The provisions concerning institutional structure should be
limited to such as may be truly needed.”27 The ACTA text states that the
ACTA Committee “shall strive to avoid unnecessary duplication of other
international efforts regarding the enforcement of intellectual property
rights,”28 and that Parties conducting capacity building and technical
assistance under ACTA “shall strive to avoid unnecessary
duplication…with respect to other international efforts.”29 The preamble
notes the desire of the Parties that “ACTA operate in a manner mutually
supportive of international enforcement work and cooperation conducted

distributed governance.
25
See CANADA – ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) NON-PAPER ON
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES UNDER THE AGREEMENT, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (scroll down to “2008” and follow “Canada
– Non-Paper on Institutional Issues” hyperlink) [hereinafter CANADA NON-PAPER].
26
See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Consolidated Text, art. 5, PIJIP IP
ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow
“Official Text - October 2, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010], and
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: Jul. 1,
2010, art. 5, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated July 1,
2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jul 1, 2010].
27
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:
Jan. 18, 2010 Consolidated Text, art. 5, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated March
18, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010].
28
See ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 5.1 ¶ 8.
29
See id. art. 4.3, ¶ 3.
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within relevant international organizations.”30
In past discussions regarding the location of the institution and whether
it would function as a stand-alone entity, some parties, including the EU,
proposed that ACTA should make use of an existing international
organization, likely in Geneva, to provide secretariat services. Korea and
Morocco preferred this option, with Korea’s preferred international
organization being the WTO and Morocco’s being WIPO.31 Some
preferred that ACTA would remain autonomous, perhaps with a secretariat
provided on a rotating basis by member states. According to the text of
ACTA, rules regarding the hosting and chairing of ACTA meetings will be
decided according to the ACTA rules and procedures, to be set within a
reasonable period of time after the entry into force of ACTA.32 The text
does not specify the use of WIPO or the WTO as a secretariat.
The ACTA text establishes an ACTA Committee comprised of one
representative from each contracting state.33 This committee will have four
main functions: 1) to review the implementation and operation of the
agreement (this could be done on a regular, pre-determined rotating basis,
or on an ad hoc basis at the request of a party to the agreement34); 2) to
consider matters concerning the development of the agreement and
amendments thereto; 3) to approve the terms of accession to the Agreement
for those seeking to become Party to the agreement; and 4) to consider any
other matter that may affect the operation of the agreement.35 The
committee is also empowered to set up ad hoc committees and working
groups; assist non-party governments in acceding to the agreement on
request; seek advice from non-governmental persons or groups; make
recommendations, provide information, and share or endorse best practices
on the implementation and operation of the agreement and on reducing
intellectual property rights infringement, including techniques for
identifying and monitoring piracy and counterfeiting; and other tasks as
30

See id., Preamble.
See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 27, art. 5.2, ¶ 1.
32
See ACTA Text – Oct 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 5.1, ¶ 4(a).
33
The Canadian non-paper suggested a smaller membership of this body:
“Negotiating partners may also wish to consider how best to coordinate issues among a
larger Council. It is noted that the number of Parties may increase significantly, as
accession is granted to additional countries. As such, another option might be to appoint a
smaller group of Parties to the Council, on either a permanent or rotating basis.” CANADA
NON-PAPER, supra note 25, at 2. Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand appear to support
a full membership on this body. See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 27, art. 5.1, ¶
1. The ACTA text states that “The Parties hereby establish the ACTA Committee and each
Party shall be represented on that Committee.” ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26,
art. 5.1, ¶ 1.
34
CANADA NON-PAPER, supra note 25, at 4.
35
See ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 5.1, ¶ 2.
31
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decided by the parties.36 The committee will generally meet once a year.37
The chair of the committee could rotate between states, but decisions
regarding specific processes for selection of chairs have not yet been taken.
Provisions within the draft texts with regard to the admission of
observers to ACTA meetings have been dropped, leaving decisions with
regard to the admission of observers to the rules and procedures of the
ACTA Committee.38
VI.

SCENARIOS

Regarding the future relationship between ACTA and WIPO, there are
three main possibilities. First, it is possible that no formal relationship will
be established between the two institutions. There are no public indications
that a formal relationship is, as of yet, on the agenda, and the ACTA text
seems to envision ACTA as a stand-alone entity. Second, a formal ACTAWIPO relationship could be established on some level. This could be a
formal agreement between the two bodies that might, as in past cases,
involve some level of information and/or service sharing. WIPO could
agree to perform technical assistance and informational functions for ACTA
(maintaining information on the laws and regulations of various countries,
for example). The WIPO Development Agenda could be used as a tool for
assisting developing countries to implement ACTA. The third former
possibility was that ACTA and WIPO could, on some level, merge. The
possibility was initially raised that WIPO could house an ACTA secretariat
or provide secretariat services to ACTA.39 This possibility was dropped
from the ACTA text.
In terms of the stature of the two organizations, there are four main
possibilities. First, it is possible that the ACTA initiative will decline or fail
to come into force. International IP agreements have been notoriously hard
to realize, especially where issues are contentious. ACTA remains
controversial and is opposed by significant groups. ACTA could also fail if
it fails to achieve the minimum number of ratifications, acceptances, and
approvals to come into force.40 A second possibility is, as some
commentators have suggested, that WIPO’s stature could decline. It seems
most likely that this decline would be a simple decline in stature as a result

36

See id. art. 5.1, ¶ 3.
See id. art. 5.1, ¶ 6.
38
See id. art. 5.1, ¶ 4.
39
See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 27, art. 5.2 ¶ 1.
40
The minimum number of accessions, according to the most recent leaked text, is six.
See ACTA Text – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 6.2, ¶ 1.
37
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of a failure to achieve new treaties, while the organization continued to
perform its other functions. WIPO could come to be seen, to a greater
extent, as primarily a technical assistance agency and administrative hub. It
is also possible, but less likely, that other organizations such as ACTA
could take over or take precedence in those functions as well. This seems
like a long-term threat, since the ACTA text appears to envision a small
institution with limited responsibilities; negotiating parties to ACTA are
concerned not to incur undue cost and seem to wish to avoid duplication of
functions amongst organizations. On the other hand, ACTA does
encompass the provision of technical assistance, requiring each Party to
provide technical assistance and work closely with other parties. This,
however, relates only to technical assistance provided to Parties to the
Agreement and prospective Parties to the Agreement, under the proviso that
“[e]ach Party shall strive to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities
described in this Article with respect to other international efforts.”41 Third,
it is possible that both ACTA and WIPO could go into decline as a result
perhaps of changing attitudes towards IP or changing geopolitics and new
innovation models. Finally, it is possible, as I have suggested, that neither
WIPO nor ACTA will decline, but that the two institutions will come to an
arrangement that sees both take on important roles in the international IP
system.
VII.

STRATEGIES

A number of strategies have historically been employed in order to
ensure that WIPO maintains a role and a significant stature at the core of the
international IP system. These include efforts to portray WIPO and its
treaties as the highest standard in intellectual property norm-setting, as was
done when the Universal Copyright Convention competed with BIRPI’s
Berne Convention, portrayed as the gold standard of intellectual property.
WIPO can now draw on its status as a broad-based multilateral organization
in its self-portrayal as the most legitimate forum for IP norm-setting. A
number of strategies have also been employed to ensure that WIPO works
in harmony with outside IP organizations, turning competition into
collaboration and ensuring that each organization has a role or niche in the
international intellectual property system. Such strategies include hosting
joint or co-located meetings and assemblies, as well as informal or
formalized information and service sharing. Such strategies have shaped
treaty language itself, where treaties laid out complementary roles, or have
41
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been revised to resemble each other enough to invite dual membership,
rather than membership in just one of the two treaties. Language has also
been included that has made it in effect impossible to exit one treaty in
favour of another. Competing international organizations based in the same
epistemic community often share an interest in collaborating, carving out
niches, and mutually ensuring each other’s legitimacy.
VIII.

CONCERNS

While the decline or disappearance of WIPO as a result of the
ACTA threat seems unlikely, important concerns remain. If a plurilateral
organization becomes the primary locus of intellectual property normsetting
among some countries, the international intellectual property system could
fracture. Core norms contained in WIPO and WTO treaties could unify the
system at a basic level, but a variety of differing norms and institutions
might govern other areas. Although a source of complexity and perhaps
uncertainty, such a scenario might bring a measure of policy innovation and
competing norms to the international intellectual property system.42
The biggest question is whether ACTA will have a formal
secretariat. While the ACTA text does not provide for a secretariat, this
does not preclude the possibility of formal offices being established in the
future. A secretariat could provide the continuity and resources necessary
to build and maintain ACTA into a true competitor to WIPO.43
The breadth of membership on the governing body of ACTA is of
prime importance to the ability of parties to the agreement to have influence
on the functioning of the ACTA institution and to guide future revisions of
the agreement. A broader or full membership on this body, or transparent
rules surrounding decisions on membership that would see all parties, at one
point or another, included, would be of particular benefit to the less
powerful parties to the agreement. The conditions upon which outsiders
might become a party to the agreement and to gain a seat on the steering
body of ACTA should also be of interest to outsiders.
The question of the location of an ACTA secretariat or ACTA
meetings has important implications. If a secretariat were housed at
multilateral organizations like WIPO or the WTO in Geneva, there might be
42
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a greater likelihood of broader engagement with ACTA, both by parties to
the agreement and observers, as a simple result of location. Such an
arrangement would signify a higher level of collaboration and support
between ACTA and the institution with which it was housed. Both
engagement and collaboration could have a variety of effects that deserve
further consideration. The provision of secretariat services by parties to the
agreement, rather than by an independent office, might signify a more
modest and frugal approach by ACTA parties, and a greater confidence in
organizations like WIPO to provide technical assistance. If secretariat
services are provided by parties to the agreement on a rotating basis, this
could provide the hosting parties with significant agenda-setting
opportunities.
Possible formal arrangements between ACTA and outside treaties
and institutions could have a strong impact on the future revision of and
implementation of ACTA, and other international IP agreements’ future
relationship to ACTA, including the ability of outside agreements and
institutions to manoeuvre with, around, and potentially against ACTA.
Such formal arrangements should be of high concern to those interested in
the future of the international IP system.
The transparency of the governing body of ACTA to non-party
states and NGOs is also an important concern. Admission of observers is
an issue of importance to the legitimacy and stature of the institution, its
responsiveness to outside concerns and developments, and to outside parties
affected by the agreement.
IX.

CONCLUSION

ACTA could potentially threaten, to some extent, WIPO’s place in
areas such as treaty-making and technical assistance, and as a result,
WIPO’s overall stature in the international intellectual property system.
However, ACTA is not an existential threat to WIPO, and the institutional
basis for ACTA appears to be, at the present time, envisioned on a relatively
small scale that leaves room for the continuing work of - and work with other international organizations, including WIPO. It seems likely, based
on past experience, that WIPO will carve out a continuing niche for itself in
the areas of administration and technical assistance, and that cooperation
between the two organizations could be established. Should this happen,
the result may be that the international intellectual property system will
consist of a large international institution with significant resources in the
area of administration, promotion, and technical assistance in intellectual
property (WIPO), alongside a small group of powers with little transparency
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leading in the area of treaty-making. It is possible that WIPO, as a large
and relatively legitimate organization, will be enlisted in the
implementation of ACTA, effectively supporting the norms created by the
smaller and non-transparent body. This scenario raises important concerns.
The structure, control, and transparency of ACTA, as well as its potential
relationship to WIPO, should be of prime concern to those who wish to
influence the architecture of the international IP system in the years ahead.
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